Friday, April 20, 2007

Housing Rights

The Supreme Court case, Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, deals with the constitutionality of a specific provision in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The provision permits local housing authorities to evict public housing tenants that are unaware of criminal activity that takes place at their residence. The Act specifically provides,
'public housing agency shall utilize leases which...provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control shall be cause for termination of tenancy.'
While the Court held that this provision was not violative of the constitution, my personal opinion is that the provision is unfair. I believe that in order to deprive someone of their interest in property, especially under the circumstances of public housing, the tenant should be well aware of the cause of that deprivation before the decision to evict is made. The tenant should be given notice and an opportunity to correct the violative behavior. The reason that public housing authorities should be more sensitive is because most, if not all, of the tenants in public housing are their because they cannot afford to live anywhere else; unlike those who lease apartments or other housing that is not public housing. Additionally, the provision does not deter any criminal activity that it wouldn't't deter if the knowledge requirement was in the provision.
The Court states that strict liability maximizes deterrence. I disagree. If the tenant is unaware of the behavior or even that any criminal behavior is committed, what exactly is being deterred? Can you really deter an action by punishing the person who had no knowledge of the action to begin with? If there is deterrence, then that deterrence is not due to the "no notice" provision, neither is it strengthened by the "no notice" provision. There is not an added advantage by not requiring that the tenant have notice of the criminal behavior before being subjected to eviction.
The Court seems to justify the statute by stating that "the statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease provision. Instead it entrusts that decision to the local housing authorities." I believe that the local housing authorities are in the best position to determine eviction status; however, the Act should require the tenant to have knowledge before the determination stage of the process is reached. The fact that the statute does not require eviction does not make it more fair.

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